As property and title attorneys, Fondren Blaize relies on the written word of the law to opine as to title on a daily basis. Words have meaning in law and property owners need to be able to rely on the consistency which our Civilian tradition provides. Charles Blaize was excited for our client, but even more excited that the Louisiana Courts refused to expand defined legal terms to reach a conclusion in equity.
On October 3, 2023, The Louisiana Supreme Court denied the Writ Application in Morrison et al v. Adams, Suit No. 2023-CC-00800 (19th JDC Suit No. 723945). The basic premise of the argument was whether a Donee assumed the liability to pay a mortgage burdening an immovable property under La. C.C. art. 3315. The major legal distinction was the difference between a Donee and a Vendee.
The Petitioner argued that when the property was donated to the Petitioner, she did not assume liability for the principal obligation secured by the mortgage and was not bound to pay the obligation secured by the mortgage as a third-party possessor under La. C.C. art. 3315. The Donation contained no specific language that the Donee assuming the principal obligation. Petitioner’s argument attempted to circumvent the public records doctrine. The Defendant countered with the Public Records Doctrine and C.C. art. 1549. Under La. C.C. art. 3280, the law specifically provides that a mortgage follows the property into whatever hands the property may pass. The Mortgage was recorded prior to the Donation. Therefore, the Petitioner had constructive knowledge of the mortgage from the public records and accepted the property donated subject to such charge. Louisiana law specifically states that a “donee acquires the thing donated subject to all of its charges…” La. C.C. art. 1549. As such, the rules of subrogation under La. C.C. art. 3315, et seq. only apply to properties acquired by an onerous title transfer and not a donation.
The Petitioner’s second argument was that the term “charge” had no defined legal meaning, thus negating the public records doctrine. The Defendant countered such argument with historical context. Before the revision of the Civil Code in 2009, Article 1551 of the Code of 1870 provided, “The property given passes to the donee with all its charges, even those which the donor has imposed between the time of the donation and that of the acceptance.”[1] Further, former Civil Code Article 1552 stated, “The universal donee is bound to pay the debts of the donor, which existed at the time of the donation, but he can discharge himself therefrom by abandoning the property given.”[2] It is unequivocal that Louisiana law has historically considered a debt and a mortgage as a charge. The Defendant argued that when the Petitioner accepted the inter vivos donation of the she did so subject to the properly recorded mortgage.
The First Circuit held that under La. C.C. art. 1549, a Donee acquires the thing donated subject to all of its charges and that the liability for assuming a principal obligation under La. C.C. art. 3315 was limited in application to a transfer by onerous title. The Court correctly evaluated the historical term “charge” to include a mortgage and found that a Donee is bound to pay the debts of the Donor burdening an immovable which existed at the time of the donation. The Denial of the Writ by the Louisiana Supreme Court upholds the Civil Code standard expressed in articles 11 through 13. Words have meaning. Technical words must be given their technical meaning. If words are ambiguous, their meaning must be sought by examining their historical context. And laws on the same subject matter must be interpreted in reference to each other. Fondren Blaize and the Civil Code tradition prevailed.
[1] See Former Louisiana Civil Code Article 1551, which basically recreates new La. C.C. art. 1549.
[2] See Former Louisiana Civil Code Article 1552.
